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THE 1981 REVISIONS TO
THE MARYLAND LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS:
AN OVERVIEW FOR THE PRACTITIONER
JAMES M. SMITH* AND RICHARD CLARK FAINT, JR.**
Effective January 1, 1981, Maryland joined the majority of states'
in enacting2 a version of the 1972 Official Text to Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code as promulgated by the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. 3 Maryland's new revised Article 9 (hereinafter cited as the
Revised Code) makes several major changes from the previous version
(hereinafter cited as the Prior Code) of the 1962 Official Text 4 in the law
of secured transactions, most notably with respect to multistate
transactions, the treatment of proceeds, filing requirements for consign-
ments, and changes and clarifications in the priority rules. The revised
Code also makes a number of technical changes that are of importance
to the practitioner in properly perfecting and dealing with secured
transactions. It is the intention of this article to highlight the important
changes made in Article 9 by focusing upon the practical effects of those
* B.A. 1971, University of Maryland; J.D. 1974, The Georgetown University Law
Center. Partner in the Baltimore law firm of Gebhardt & Smith.
** B.A. 1975, Towson State University; J.D. 1978, University of Baltimore School of
Law. Partner in the Baltimore law firm of Gebhardt & Smith.
1. More than one-half of the states have enacted some version of the 1972 Official
Text. At least one commentator recently has stated that the 1972 Official Text "will likely
be the law in all states (except Louisiana) before too long." B. CLARK, THE LAW OF
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 14.1 (1980).
2. 1980 Md. Laws ch. 824.
3. The 1972 Official Text, the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSION-
ERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT AND
COMMENTS OF ARTICLE 9 SECURED TRANSACTIONS [hereinafter cited as 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT],
was published in the spring of 1972. For a general discussion of the changes between the
1972 OFFICIAL TEXT and the 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT, see B. CLARK, supra note 1, at
14.1- 14.11; W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS passim (1978);
Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REV. 477 (1973); Funk, The Proposed
Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 Bus. LAW. 1465 (1971), 27 Bus.
LAW. 321 (1971); Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the U.C.C., 76 COM.
L.J. 416 (1971), 77 COM. L.J. 12 (1972); Levenberg, Comments on Certain Proposed
Amendments to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1971).
Additionally, the rationale for the various changes made by the Board can be found in the
Comments to the 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT, which comments were not adopted by Maryland
[hereinafter cited as 1972 OFFICIAL COMMENTS], and in the Appendix to the 1972 OFFICIAL
TEXT entitled 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT SHOWING CHANGES MADE IN FORMER TEXT OF ARTICLE 9,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND OF RELATED SECTIONS AND REASONS FOR CHANGES [hereinafter
cited as REASONS FOR CHANGES].
4. Maryland adopted, with minor variations, the 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT. 1963 Md.
Laws ch. 538.
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changes upon secured transactions in Maryland, and to discuss the
procedures that practitioners must follow in order to comply with the
new revisions.
I. MULTISTATE TRANSACTIONS
Section 9-103 of the Revised Code, governing which jurisdiction's
laws control perfection or non-perfection, 5 has been totally revised and
is a significant departure from previously existing law. It provides
simplified, mandatory rules for filing which vary depending upon the
specific type of collateral involved in the transaction. 6 Hence, the first
steps for the practitioner in dealing with a multiple jurisdiction
perfection question under the Revised Code are to ascertain the specific
classification of the subject collateral, and then to refer to the rules
relating to that particular type of collateral under Section 9-103. 7
A. Documents, Instruments, and Ordinary Goods
1. The General "Situs Rule"
Section 9-103(1)(b) of the Revised Code states a general situs rule
with respect to collateral consisting of documents,8 instruments, 9 or
5. It should be noted that Section 9-103 essentially governs the question of
perfection or nonperfection of the secured interest holder vis a vis third parties, and it is
not a choice of law rule between the contracting parties. Section 1-105(1) permits the
contracting parties to agree among themselves when the transaction "bears a reasonable
relationship" to "this state" or to "another state or nation" that the laws of the agreed
state or nation will control their rights and duties. However, such an agreement is not
binding in determining perfection questions with respect to third parties. See, e.g., In Re
Automated Bookbinding Services, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 1128, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 209 (D. Md.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 471 F.2d 546, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 897 (4th Cir. 1972) (although
security agreement for machinery brought into Maryland from New York provided that
the New York U.C.C. would govern the rights of the parties and such an agreement could
arguably control in a dispute between the parties to the agreement, those parties could not
successfully bind a creditor of the debtor who was not a party to the agreement); Doyle v.
Northrop Corp., 455 F. Supp. 1318, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 932 (D. N.J. 1978) (although parties to
a contract are free to choose the law they wish to govern the transaction, the provisions of
Article 9-103 are mandatory).
6. Section 9-103(1) provides the rules governing collateral ordinarily located at a
fixed point, that is, documents, instruments, and ordinary goods; subsection (2) applies to
movable collateral for which the law requires notation of any security interest on the
certificate of title; subsection (3) provides both the rules applicable to collateral that, by its
nature, is not easy to locate, such as accounts and general intangibles, and the rules
applicable to equipment or inventory that is mobile and is not covered by a certificate of
title; subsection (4) deals simply with the special problems of chattel paper; and, finally,
subsection (5) covers minerals, including oil and gas, and the laws applicable thereto.
7. See note 6 supra.
8. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-105(f) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
9. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-105(i) (Cum. Supp. "1980).
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ordinary goods:' ° the law controlling perfection of a security interest in
these types of collateral will be the law of the jurisdiction where the
collateral is located "when the last event occurs on which is based the
assertion that the security interest is perfected or unperfected." This
new provision retains the "location of the collateral" test as embodied in
Section 9-103(3) of the Prior Code, but it significantly changes the time
at which the test is to be applied.
Section 9-103(3) of the Prior Code provided that the "validity" of
the security interest" was to be determined by the law of the
jurisdiction where the security interest "attached." Attachment occurred
under Prior Code Section 9-204(1) when there was a security agree-
ment providing that it attach, when value had been given, and when the
debtor had rights in the collateral. 12 Under the Prior Code, when the
last of these three events occurred, the situs test of Section 9-103(3)
was triggered for reference as to the validity of the security interest. In
contrast, perfection occurs under both the Prior Code and the Revised
Code" when the security interest has attached and when, depending
upon the type of subject collateral, a financing statement has been filed
or the secured party has obtained possession of the collateral."1
Thus, under the provisions of the Revised Code, to determine which
state's law governs perfection or non-perfection in a multistate transac-
10. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-105(h) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
11. The focus of Revised Code Section 9-103 upon questions of "perfection or
non-perfection" as opposed to the question of the "validity of the security interest" reflects
the intent of the drafters of the 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT strictly to confine the focus of Section
9-103 to conflicts rules determining perfection and not choice of law questions between
the contracting parties. See REASONS FOR CHANGES, supra note 3, at § 9-103 n.1, where it
is stated:
The section now concerns itself exclusively with perfection of security interests and
the effect of perfection or non-perfection thereof. The 1962 Code has several references
to the "validity" of a security agreement, and these have been deleted. Likewise, a
deletion has been made from Section 9-102 of the language which went beyond that
section's basic function of defining the scope of Article 9 and purported to state a
choice of law rule. These two changes make it clear that Article 9 does not govern
problems of choice of law between the original parties, and that this question is
governed by the general choice of law provisions in Section 1-105.
However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case ofIn Re Automated Bookbinding
Services, Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 897 (4th Cir. 1972), found that the term
"validity" as used in Section 9-103(3) of the Prior Code should be interpreted as meaning
"perfection."
12. The Revised Code combines the concepts of enforceability and attachment in
Section 9-203. However, the criteria for attachment as embodied in Prior Section
9-204(1) remain the same.
13. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-303 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
14. For certain limited exceptions to this general rule, see MD. COM. LAW ConE ANN.
§ 9-302 (1975).
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tion involving documents, instruments, or ordinary goods, one must look
to where the last event occurred on which an assertion of perfection or
non-perfection is based. 5 For example, if perfection is to be obtained by
filing, and filing is the last event to occur of those events required for
perfection, then a proper filing would be where the collateral is located.
Similarly, if perfection is obtained by possession and possession is the
last event to occur, one would look to the state where possession
occurred. However, if one of the other events of perfection occurs last,
then it is crucial that the collateral still be in the jurisdiction where the
filing was made. If the collateral has been moved to another jurisdiction
after filing, but prior to the happening of the last event, then perfection
will date from the time of filing in the new jurisdiction where the
collateral is then located. In most cases and as a matter of practicality,
the general rule in circumstances involving documents of title, instru-
ments, or ordinary goods is that filing should be made at the situs of the
collateral, and changed upon movement of the collateral.
2. The "30 Day Rule" Exception to the "Situs Rule".
Section 9-103(1)(c) of the Revised Code provides an important
exception to the general "situs rule" in the limited circumstances of
purchase money financing' 6 of goods intended for transport. Basically,
this provision provides that if the parties to a transaction creating a
purchase money security interest in goods in one jurisdiction "under-
stand at the time that the security interest attaches that the goods will
be kept in another jurisdiction,"' 7 then the law of the other (the
receiving) jurisdiction will govern perfection from the time the security
interest attaches until thirty days after possession of the goods is
obtained by the debtor, and thereafter,' 8 if the goods actually reach the
receiving jurisdiction before the expiration of the thirty-day period.
This rule continues the policy of Prior Code Section 9-103(3) that if
the parties intend for goods purchased in one jurisdiction to be kept in
15. There has been much debate by commentators about the meaning of Revised
Section 9-103(1)(b). Some believe that the "last event" must be one of the affirmative
steps required for perfection of the security interest. Others contend that since the test
formulated in Section 9-103(1)(b) also focuses on non-perfection, the "last event" need not
necessarily be one of the steps required for perfection. Compare Kripke, The "Last Event"
Test for Perfection of Security Interests under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 50
N.Y.U. L. REV. 47 (1975) with Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REV. 477
(1973).
16. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-107 (1975).
17. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-103 (1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
18. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-403.1.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides for a period of
effectiveness of twelve years for financing statements filed after June 30, 1978.
1981]
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another jurisdiction, the laws of the jurisdiction where the goods will be
kept should govern the secured transaction. Even so, the new "30 Day
Rule" is a major change from, and improvement over, the provisions of
the Prior Code. The new "30 Day Rule" is limited to purchase money
security interests in goods, while Prior Code Section 9-103(3) applied to
personal property subject to any type of security interest.19 Additional-
ly, while both the Prior and Revised Codes were meant to determine
which state's law governed the secured transaction, the Revised Code
deals with issues of perfection while the Prior Code focused on the
validity of the security interest.20 Moreover, the new rule covers the
movement of collateral in both directions - incoming goods to "this
jurisdiction" and outgoing goods from "this jurisdiction" - while the old
rule covered only incoming goods.2 Finally, more certainty is provided
by the Revised Code as to the ascertainment of when the thirty-day
period is in effect: the time period ends thirty days after the debtor
receives possession of the goods. Under the Prior Code the time period
ended thirty days after the date the security interest attached.
In dealing with the operation of the "30 Day Rule," it is important
to keep in mind that the rule applies only if the parties understand at
the time the security interest attaches that the goods will be kept in
another jurisdiction. The practitioner should be especially wary of the
evidentiary problems of intent that might arise in ascertaining what the
parties "understood" at the time the security interest attached. It is
suggested that the prudent practitioner representing the creditor will
carefully memorialize in the security agreement the "understanding" of
the parties that the goods are to be kept2 2 in another jurisdiction.
Further, the practitioner must be cognizant that a filing in the receiving
state must be made (unless the secured creditor is perfected by
possession). "The 30-day period is not a period of grace during which
19. Due to the nature of the "30 Day Rule," its most frequent use is probably when
purchase money security interests are given. See W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, supra note
3, at 229.
20. But see In Re Automated Bookbinding Services, Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
897 (4th Cir. 1972) (court interpreted "validity" as used in Prior Section 9-103(3) to mean
"perfection").
21. W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 230.
22. The Code does not define the meaning of "kept". The 1972 OFFICIAL COMMENTS,
supra note 3, at § 9-103, explain: ". . . the concepts that goods are 'kept' in a state or
'brought' into a state . . . imply a stopping place of a permanent nature in the state, not
merely transit or storage intended to be transitory." Be aware, however, that Maryland
did not enact these comments as a part of the Revised Article 9. Although Prior Section
9-103(3) applied the "30 Day Rule" to property brought into the state "for purposes other
than transportation through this State," this language is not a part of Revised Section
9-103(1)(c).
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filing is unnecessary or has retroactive effect, but merely states the
other jurisdiction is the place of filing."23 Dual filing is often recom-
mended and necessary since it provides protection in the situation
where the goods, for unforeseen reasons, do not reach the receiving
jurisdiction before the end of the thirty day period.
3. The "Four Month Rule" Exception to the "Situs Rule."
Revised Code Section 9-103(1)(d) provides a second important
exception to the general "situs rule" with respect to "collateral" (as
opposed to merely "goods" as covered by the "30 Day Rule") brought into
and kept in this state (the receiving state) while subject to a perfected
security interest in another state. In such a situation the creditor's
security interest will remain perfected unless action is required in the
receiving state to perfect (i.e., filing) and that action is not taken before
the first to occur of (i) the expiration of perfection in the other
jurisdiction or (ii) the expiration of four months after the collateral is
brought into the receiving state. In other words, for four months the
receiving state will recognize perfection under the law of the jurisdiction
from which the collateral came unless the remaining period of
effectiveness of the perfection in that jurisdiction was less than four
months.24 If timely perfection occurs in the receiving state prior to the
expiration of either of these two time periods, the security interest
remains perfected and will be effective even against a bona fide
purchaser for value.25 If, however, the security interest becomes
unperfected because proper action was not taken before the shorter of
the two time periods expires, it is ineffective with respect to a
subsequent person who became a purchaser after removal and is
subordinate to any who would have priority over an unperfected
security interest.2 6 Under the 1962 Official Text, there was considerable
litigation in other jurisdictions involving the situation where the
perfected secured party did not file in the receiving state, but a bona
fide purchaser for value acquired the collateral prior to the expiration of
23. 1972 OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 3, at § 9-103 comment 2. The effect of a late
filing is governed by other Article 9 provisions. See, e.g., MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 9-103 and 9-312 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
24. 1972 OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 3, at § 9-103 comment 7.
25. See, e.g., Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Dinner, 302 F. Supp. 897, 6
U.C.C. Rep. 937 (D. Colo. 1969); Exchange Bank of Osceola v. Jarrett, 588 P.2d 1006, 25
U.C.C. Rep. 877 (1979); Garden City Production Credit Ass'n. v. Lanna, 186 Neb. 668, 186
N.W.2d 99, 8 U.C.C. 1163 (1971).
26. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Wells Motor Co., Inc., 374 So. 2d 319,
27 U.C.C. Rep. 267 (Ala. 1979); Wind v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 260 Pa. Super. 385,
394 A.2d 980, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 268 (1978).
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the four month period.2" This apparent ambiguity in Section 9-103 is
eliminated in the Revised Code by the language of Section 9-103(1)(d)(i)
which provides that where the security interest has not been perfected
in the receiving state by the end of the four month period or before the
expiration of perfection in the other state, whichever occurs first, the
security interest is "thereafter deemed to have been unperfected as
against a person who became a purchaser2 8 after removal."
The leading decision in Maryland construing the application of the
"Four Month Rule" is the case of In Re Automated Bookbinding
Services, Inc.29 In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit was faced with a factual situation under the Prior Code
in which the secured party shipped goods to a debtor in Maryland and
subsequently filed a financing statement in Maryland covering the
equipment less than four months after the goods had been shipped from
New York. In the litigation, the creditor contended that it had priority
over the perfected lien of a finance company in after-acquired property,
reasoning that it had perfected in New York by possession and
accordingly it was entitled to the four month time period to file in
Maryland under the provisions of Prior Code Section 9-103(3). Judge
Sobeloff, writing for the court, held that the four month rule was
inapplicable to the case and explained:
[Prior Code Section 9-103(3)] was designed to protect secured
parties whose debtors absconded with their collateral. When the
secured party knows where the collateral is to be taken, and that the
transfer will take place within the short period of 30 days after the
security interest attached, there is no reason or justification for
allowing the secured party . . .to delay filing in the second state
... .(emphasis added)30
One commentator has characterized the result in In Re Automated
Bookbinding Service, Inc. as "eminently sound in its reasoning, and the
27. For decisions holding that a bona fide purchaser for value prevails over the
secured creditor under such circumstances, see United States v. Squires, 378 F. Supp. 798,
15 U.C.C. Rep. 718 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Arrow Ford, Inc. v. Western Landscape Construction
Co., Inc., 23 Ariz. App. 281, 532 P.2d 553, 16 U.C.C. 1124 (1975). For decisions holding
what is apparently the majority view that all purchases made during the four month
period are subject to the secured creditor's lien, see United States v. Burnette-Carter Co.,
575 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1978); Pascack Valley Bank and Trust Company v. Ritar Ford, Inc.,
6 Conn. 489, 276 A.2d 800, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 523 (1970); First National Bank of Bay Shore v.
Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 949 (1966).
28. Defined at MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 1-201(33) (1975).
29. 471 F.2d 546, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 897 (4th Cir. 1972).
30. Id. at 554-55.
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result is codified in the 1972 amendments to Section 9-103." 31 It is
submitted, however, that Judge Sobeloff's reasoning cannot be extended
under the Revised Code to become an all-encompassing rule that the "30
Day Rule" applies when the secured party expects the goods to be moved
to another state and the "Four Month Rule" applies solely to the
absconding debtor situation and not to any other situations where the
secured party has knowledge in advance that the goods are to be
relocated into another state. This becomes readily apparent when it is
realized that the "30 Day Rule" under the Revised Code applies only to
purchase money security interests. Hence, it is reasonable to contend
that Judge Sobeloff's position is applicable at most in the purchase
money security interest situation, since the drafters of Revised Code
Section 9-103 could not have intended to deprive secured parties
dealing with non-purchase money security interests of protection under
both the "30 Day Rule" and the "Four Month Rule" when, at the
inception of the transaction, the subject collateral is intended for
immediate relocation. Moreover, the language of Revised Code Section
9-103(d) in delineating the "Four Month Rule" contains no references
or limitations based upon intent or knowledge, and instead simply
applies itself without restriction to "a security interest perfected under
the law of the jurisdiction from which the collateral was removed." It is
suggested, however, that the prudent practitioner in Maryland should
continue to file immediately when dealing with relocation of collateral
into Maryland, and should not rely solely upon the protection of the
"Four Month Rule" until the continued extent of viability of In Re
Automated Bookbinding Services, Inc. has been clearly determined.
Finally, it is clear that under either the "30 Day Rule" or the "Four
Month Rule" the prudent creditor should police his collateral very
carefully to ensure that it actually reaches and remains in the
jurisdiction where the creditor is properly perfected.32
31. B. CLARK, supra note 1, at 9.3.
32. The classic case illustrating the perils of financing goods that are being transfered
between jurisdictions is the case of In Re Dennis Mitchell Industries, Inc., 419 F.2d 349, 6
U.C.C. Rep. 573 (3rd Cir. 1969), where the court dealt with the factual situation of a buyer
that received delivery of equipment under a conditional sales agreement in New York,
which agreement provided that the equipment was to be taken to Pennsylvania. Without
policing the collateral to ensure knowledge of its eventual situs, the conditional seller filed
in Pennsylvania. The equipment instead was transported directly to New Jersey and the
buyer subsequently filed for bankruptcy, with the result that the conditional seller was
forced to have an unperfected security interest in the equipment.
1981]
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B. Goods Covered by a Certificate of Title
Section 9-103(2) of the Revised Code sets forth rules determining
the effect of perfection or non-perfection (including the conflict of law
rules) for goods covered by a certificate of title under a state's statute
that requires indication of a security interest on the certificate as a
condition of perfection.33
The Revised Code expands upon the simplistic approach of Section
9-103(4) of the Prior Code by adding several explanatory provisions. It
continues to provide that where the collateral is covered by a certificate
of title requiring indication thereon of the security interest, the law of
the issuing jurisdiction will govern the effect of perfection. However, the
Revised Code improves upon this provision by adding that the notation
of the security interest in the issuing jurisdiction will control until four
months after the goods are removed from the issuing jurisdiction, and
thereafter until the collateral is registered in another jurisdiction, 4 but
in no event beyond the surrender of the old certificate.35 Section
9-103(2)(c) deals with the situation where a security interest is
perfected otherwise than by notation on the certificate of title. This
section provides that a perfected security interest in goods that come
into this state and are thereafter covered by a certificate of title is
subject to the general four month rule provided in Section 9-103(1)(d).36
Finally, there is special protection for the non-professional buyer.
Revised Code Section 9-103(2)(d) provides that a security interest
perfected in another jurisdiction in goods brought into this state is
subordinate to the rights of a buyer of goods who is not a professional
seller of goods of that kind, to the extent he gives value and takes
delivery of the goods after issuance of the certificate and without
33. Maryland is a "title" state. The provisions of MD. TRANS. CODE ANN. § 13-201 et
seq. (1977), specify the method by which security interests in motor vehicles are to be
perfected.
34. See In Re Hartberg, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1429 (E.D. Wis., Bankr. J. 1979), where the
court applied Section 9-103(2) to find that a perfected lien by notation on a motor vehicle
certificate in Florida became invalid after the automobile was removed to Wisconsin for
more than four months and was registered in Wisconsin, and that actual knowledge of the
lien holder was irrelevant.
35. The 1972 OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 3, at § 9-103 comment 4(c), state that
the rationale for this provision is that since it is the secured party who holds the
certificate, surrender could not occur without his action.
36. See notes 24 to 32 and accompanying text supra.
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knowledge of the security interest, and if he receives a "clean"
certificate of title issued by this state showing no security interests.3 7
C. Accounts, General Intangibles, and Mobile Goods
Section 9-103(1) of the Prior Code provided that with respect to
"accounts, 38 filing should be in the jurisdiction where the account
records were kept.39 Prior Code Section 9-103(2) provided that the
"tchief place of business" of the debtor was where filing should be
accomplished for "general intangibles"40 or with regard to "goods of a
type which are normally used in more than one jurisdiction" (mobile
goods). The Revised Code has a unified provision in Section 9-103(3)(b)
which provides that the law (including the conflicts of law rules)
governing perfection for all three categories of collateral (accounts,
general intangibles, and mobile goods) will be the "jurisdiction in which
the debtor is located," which phrase is defined in Section 9-103(3)(d) to
mean the place of business of the debtor if he has one, or at his "chief
executive office" if he has more than one place of business, or otherwise
at his residence.4 Section 9-103(3)(a) of the Revised Code further adds
37. As stated in Coogan, supra note 3, at 545, the purpose of this provision is
"obvious", since:
[T]his is the class of buyer least able to protect itself. Officers issuing a certificate of
title will not always be able to know all the parties who have security interests in
other states and will not always be meticulous about either contacting them or listing
them on the certificate. Moreover, sellers may transfer fraudulent certificates.
Nevertheless, the issuing state has a strong interest in insuring that its certificates
will be trusted by those most likely to rely upon them. The professional buyer, on the
other hand, is presumed to know the practices of his trade and to be on the alert for
the possible existence of security interest whose actual existence is not disclosed.
38. See MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-106 (Cum. Supp. 1980), which provides a
different definition of "Account" from that formerly provided.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ed Lusk Const. Co., Inc., 504 F.2d 328, 15 U.C.C. Rep.
952 (10th Cir. 1974) (Oklahoma Bank that was assigned for security purposes an interest
in an Oklahoma contract by an Arkansas corporation was required to file in Arkansas
where the assignor kept its records); Barocas v. Bohemian Import Co., Inc., 518 P.2d 850,
14 U.C.C. Rep. 191 (Colo. App. 1974) (in action for attachment upon two accounts in
Colorado, the court held that the validity and perfection of security interest of creditor was
determined by New York since the only office of the defendant was located in New York).
40. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-106 (1975).
41. The drafters of the 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT explained that the change with respect to
account filing to the debtor's "chief executive office" was to eliminate the uncertainty that
record searchers might have as to where a debtor keeps his records. REASONS FOR CHANGE,
supra note 3, at § 9-103 n.3. However, under either test, such a determination is likely to
involve contested and difficult factual determinations with respect to some types of
debtors. See, e.g., Associates Financial Services Co., Inc. v. First National Bank of South
Central Michigan, 82 Mich. App. 495, 266 N.W.2d 490, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 420 (1978) (filing
was correct in Indiana with respect to mobile goods although debtor was a Michigan
corporation, since debtor's "principal place of business" was deemed to be in Indiana where
1981]
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new language with respect to "mobile goods" not covered by a certificate
of title, which specifies that the goods must indeed be mobile and which
expands the definition from the Prior Code to include goods "held for
lease."
Thus, when dealing with general intangibles, accounts, and non-
titled mobile goods, filing should be made where the debtor is located.
Care should be taken in dealing with the far-flung debtor in ascertain-
ing his "chief executive office," since a factual dispute could easily arise
in connection with this determination. Prudent counsel should require
an affirmative representation from the debtor in the security agreement
as to the location of the debtor and his chief executive office. In cases of
doubt where multiple filings are not burdensome, it is a safe practice to
file in all jurisdictions where the debtor is located.4 2 Additionally, the
determination of whether particular collateral constitutes "mobile
goods" involves a factual determination that, if settled adversely, can
eliminate a secured party's claim to perfection.43 In cases of doubt as to
the exact nature of the goods, it is prudent to file both at the situs of the
collateral and at the situs of the debtor.
Finally, Revised Code Section 9-103(3)(e) provides some protection
for the perfected security interest creditor when the debtor changes his
location. Like the rule under Section 9-103(1)(d), the perfected security
interest will remain so until the expiration of four months after the
change of debtor's location to another jurisdiction or until perfection
would have ceased under the laws of the first jurisdiction, whichever
expires first.
it gave an Indiana address, had development of Indiana property as prime concern, and
bulldozer was delivered to Indiana); In Re Neuman, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 768 (W.D. Tenn. 1979)
(the maintenance of two checking accounts by a professional basketball player in Utah
was sufficient to establish his "office" in Utah); Moody Day Co. v. Westview Nat. Bank,
Waco., 452 S.W.2d 572, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (Texas resident who
obtained the bulk of his income from Texas business managed by his wife found to have
chief place of business in New Mexico where he operated mining operations that he
regarded as his chief concern and where he spent most of his time).
42. See Associates Financial Services Co., Inc. v. First National Bank of South
Central Michigan, 82 Mich. App. 495, 266 N.W.2d 490, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 420 (1978).
43. As noted by the court in In Re Dennis Mitchell Industries, Inc., 419 F.2d 349, 358,
6 U.C.C. Rep. 573, 586 (3rd Cir. 1969), in determining that hydraulic cutting machines
used in the manufacturing of metal and plastic products are not "goods of a type which are
normally used in more than one jurisdiction":
It seems clear that the test for mobile goods turns on the type of goods involved and
not on their actual use in or transportation between more than one jurisdiction. To
say that goods fall within that section simply because they may be and are easily
transported from state to state overlooks the nature of the test for mobile goods.
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D. Chattel Paper
Section 9-103(4) of the Revised Code succinctly sets forth the choice
of law rules for chattel paper,44 by providing that where the security
interest is perfected by possession, the chattel paper is subject to the
rules stated for goods in Section 9-103(1), and that where the security
interest is perfected by filing, the rules of Section 9-103(3) governing
intangibles will control.
E. Minerals, Oil, and Gas
Both the Prior Code and the Revised Code treat preextraction
mineral rights as real estate and provide that they are not governed by
Article 9 of the U.C.C., although the Revised Code is more explicit as to
this exclusion.45 However, Revised Code Section 9-103(5) provides that
the place for filing with respect to the perfection of security interests in
extracted minerals (including oil and gas) and accounts generated by
the sale of minerals is the jurisdiction where the minehead or wellhead
is located.4"
It should also be noted that special filing requirements exist under
the Revised Code for this type of collateral. Section 9-401(1)(b) provides
that proper filing is "in the office where a mortgage of the real estate
concerned would be filed or recorded," and Section 9-402(5) requires
that the financing statement must show that it covers "this type of
collateral," recite that it is "to be recorded in the land records," and
contain a description of the real estate, as well as the name of the record
owner of the real estate if' the debtor does not have an interest in the
real estate.
II. PROCEEDS
As was true of the Prior Code provision, Section 9-306 sets forth
the rights of a secured party in the proceeds received by a debtor upon
disposition of collateral and the requirements for perfecting his interest
in such proceeds. Even so, Revised Code Section 9-306 provides greater
44. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-105(I)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
45. See MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-107 (1975). Note that Revised Code Sections
9-103(5) and 9-105(1)(h) more clearly delineate the concept of extraction.
46. The rationale for this change is that in many cases mineral rights are split into a
variety of interests and it is unnecessarily burdensome to require searches to review the
location of a multitude of different assignors who may be scattered throughout the
country. 1972 OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 3, at § 9-103 comment 8.
19811
520 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 40
clarity and specificity in defining the rules relating to proceeds in an
attempt to cure many of the ambiguities that had developed concerning
the treatment of proceeds under Article 9.
A major addition to Article 9, which helps to eliminate some of the
confusion as to the scope of the term "proceeds, 47 is its explicit
treatment of insurance benefits. Revised Code Section 9-306(1) specifi-
cally provides that insurance benefits payable by reason of damage or
loss to the collateral constitute proceeds, with the exception of insurance
proceeds payable to someone not a party to the security agreement. 4' A
47. Although at least one court has indicated that the definition of proceeds is to be
given "a flexible and broad content," In Re Munger, 495 F.2d 511, 513, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 790,
792 (9th Cir. 1974), the case law is at best confusing in this area, with many courts taking
a less expansive view of the applicability of this term. See, e.g., American East India Corp.
v. Ideal Shoe Co., 400 F. Supp. 141, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 527 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (where the rights of
an assignee of a contract right who had the duty to perform under a contract were
subordinated to a perfected security interest in the contract right, the secured party's
remedy did not include a right to receive an interest in the payment pursuant to its
secured interest in the payment earned by the assignee's performance since it was not
"proceeds"); Division of Western Farm Service, Inc. v. Central Valley Feed Yards, Inc., 70
Cal. App. 3d 513, 139 Cal. Rptr. 8, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 221 (1977) (money advanced to debtor
for promise to sell hay did not constitute "proceeds" of the crop; there could be no proceeds
until sale); First National Bank of Brush v. Bostron, 39 Colo. App. 107, 564 P.2d 964, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 1475 (1977) (security interest in feed did not extend to cattle which consumed
the feed since the cattle were not "proceeds" of the collateral); In Re Continental Trucking,
Inc., 16 U.C.C. Rep. 526 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (where collateral consisted of a truck, a check
representing service warranty benefits did not constitute "proceeds"); Bank of New York
v. Margiota, 99 Misc. 2d 423, 416 N.Y.S.2d 493, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 1032 (1979) (secured
interest holder in an automobile has no action against third party for damage to the
automobile since a cause of action cannot be said to be "proceeds" of the collateral); In Re J
& J Auto Sales, Inc., 9 U.C.C. Rep. 909 (E.D. Tenn. Ref. 1971) (a percentage of the
wholesale cost of new automobiles sold at retail which an automobile manufacturer had
agreed to pay under its dealership agreement did not constitute proceeds of dealer's
inventory). For a discussion of insurance benefits, see note 48 infra. Nevertheless, the
decisions of other courts show a willingness to extend the reach of the term "proceeds."
See, e.g., In Re Munger, 495 F.2d 511, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 790 (9th Cir. 1974) (secured interest
holder in crops and proceeds is secured into the subsidy payments made by the federal
government in connection with the crops as "proceeds"); Matthews v. Artic Tire, Inc., 106
R.I. 691, 262 A.2d 831, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 369 (1970) (the drafters have used "broad and
encompassing language" in describing proceeds). See also note 50 infra.
48. The rationale for this exception, that although Section 9-306(1) does confer a
right in insurance proceeds "flowing to the debtor vis-a-vis the collateral," it also confers a
statutory right upon third persons who are not parties to the security agreement and to
whom such benefits are made payable, was explained by the court in McGraw-Edison
Credit Corp. v. All State Insurance Co., 406 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 767, 772
(1978):
[Dlirect recovery from the buyer's insurer would impose upon the insurer the onerous
burden of searching the record for the existence of liens on personalty even though the
insurer has no privity of contract with the secured creditor and is probably unaware of
the latter's existence. More importantly, as between the secured creditor and the
buyer's insurer, the former is usually in the better position to police the enforcement
of its agreement with the debtor with respect to insurance coverage on the collateral.
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corresponding change was made in Revised Code Section 9-104, which
under the Prior Code had provided an exemption from the application of
Article 9 of "an interest in or claim in or under any policy or
insurance.'49 Although this specific automatic inclusion of insurance
benefits into the definition of proceeds is a welcome addition in
clarifying an area of major dispute, 50 as a matter of practicality, it is
still prudent for the practitioner representing the secured creditor to
insist also that his client be specifically named as the loss payee under
the applicable insurance policy.
Under the Prior Code an "apparent inconsistency and ambiguity"'"
existed between the provisions of Section 9-203(1)(b), which implied
that a claim for proceeds had to be specifically stated in the security
agreement, and Section 9-306(2), which appeared to state an absolute
right to proceeds. Section 9-203(3) of the Revised Code deals sensibly
with this problem by providing an automatic right to proceeds unless
"otherwise agreed" in the security agreement. Moreover, Revised Code
Section 9-306(3) eliminates the need "to check the proceeds box" 52 by
its treatment of a filed claim to the original collateral as automatically
constituting a filing as to the proceeds of that collateral.
49. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-104(g) (1975).
50. The courts have differed as to the inclusion of insurance benefits into the
definition of proceeds. See, e.g., the following cases holding that insurance proceeds are not
proceeds: In Re Waltman, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 576 (D. Ala., Bankr. J. 1975); In Re Levine, 6
U.C.C. Rep. 238 (D. Conn. Ref. 1969); White v. Household Finance Corp., 302 S.E.2d 828,
13 U.C.C. Rep. 858 (Ind. App. 1973); Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 943
(Me. 1968); In Re Parks, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 334 (E.D. Tenn., Bankr. J. 1976). But see the
following cases holding that insurance proceeds under the 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT are
proceeds: Paskow v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 579 F.2d 949, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 1009 (5th Cir.
1978); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 569 (2nd
Cir. 1976); In Re Hunter, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 928 (D. Ohio, Ref. 1971); Ettinger v. Central Penn.
Nat. Bank, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 1192 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
51. REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-306.
52. Preprinted finance statement forms routinely have a box that can be "checked" to
indicate that proceeds are secured. Professor Thomas M. Quinn has opined that many of
the proceeds problems arose under the 1962 version of Article 9 because it was "too
simple" to check the proceeds box. As Professor Quinn states:
The box was routinely checked and the proceeds clause now operated like a vacuum
cleaner, literally sucking into its maw everything that came through the debtor's
door, thereby creating massive priority disputes between inventory financers,
receivable financers, and chattel paper financers, to name but a few. Nor was that all,
for checking that nasty proceeds box, it seemed, had the miraculous effect of
perfecting (by filing) assets that could not be perfected by filing, e.g. "instruments."
No less wondrous was the box's apparent ability to allow for perfecting by filing in one
location (as proceeds) notwithstanding the fact that the Code mandated filing
somewhere else as to that type of collateral (as original collateral) - a nightmare, to
put it mildly.
T. M. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND LAW DIGEST 4I 9-3061All31 (1978).
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A major limitation exists under Revised Section 9-306(3) to this
general rule that there is no longer a need to indicate a reference to
proceeds on the financing statements. This limitation, of extreme
danger to the secured lender, provides that a perfected security interest
will become unperfected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the
debtor, absent reperfection, where the filing of the security interest in
the original collateral of the transaction is not sufficient, either because
of inappropriate location or improper means of perfection, to perfect a
security interest in the type of collateral of which the proceeds now
consist.53 For example, where the security interest was perfected in the
original collateral by filing, but that collateral has been replaced by a
note, with respect to which a security interest can be perfected only by
possession,54 the secured lender would become unperfected with respect
to the note ten days after the debtor received the note. Similarly, a
problem might arise in the situation where the proceeds were accounts
receivable relating to mineral rights (recall that filing must be in the
jurisdiction of the minehead or wellhead),55 or where inventory is sold
and generates an account to a debtor with a chief place of business in
another jurisdiction (where, as discussed above, filing should be
made).56
It should be noted that under Revised Code Section 9-306(3)(b) the
perfected security interest remains perfected in identifiable cash
proceeds. Nevertheless, a problem arises under Revised Code Section
9-306(3)(a) if the cash proceeds are then used to acquire collateral that
is not the type of collateral originally indicated on the financing
statement. In such a situation, the perfected security interest lapses,
absent reperfection, after ten days. For example, where a creditor is
secured as to a debtor's inventory, the debtor sells some inventory for
cash, and then uses the cash to purchase goods, equipment, or some
other type of non-inventory collateral, and the secured creditor does not
reperfect his security interest within the ten day grace period, he will
lose his perfected security interest in the collateral purchased with the
cash. Practitioners representing lenders involved in inventory financing
53. The practical effect of this rule is as stated by Funk, supra note 3, at 1480:
[Slomeone dealing with a prospective debtor who finds a financing statement on file
should realize that the filing creditor has a permanently perfected security interest in
all the property of the type described in the financing statement and all goods directly
exchanged for such property, such as trade-ins; but that the creditor will have only a
temporarily perfected interest in other types of property acquired by the debtor with
cash or bank deposits.
54. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-304(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
55. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-401(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
56. See notes 38 to 43 and accompanying text supra.
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might well consider as an alternative to this type of exposure, routinely
providing a very broad generic list of multiple types of collateral on the
financing statement. In any event, it is clear that the new proceeds
requirements of Section 9-306 militate that secured lenders must closely
police their collateral and carefully monitor their continued perfection
in proceeds.
Revised Code Section 9-306(4) states the rules governing a secured
creditor's claim to proceeds in the event of "insolvency proceedings,
initiated by or against a debtor." This provision states that the perfected
secured party has a perfected security interest in: identifiable non-cash
proceeds and separate deposit accounts containing only proceeds;
identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money that is neither
commingled with other money nor deposited in a deposit account prior
to insolvency proceedings; and identifiable cash proceeds in the form of
checks and the like that are not deposited in a deposit account prior to
insolvency proceedings.5 7 The secured creditor, then, does prevail over
the trustee in bankruptcy as to those identifiable proceeds described
above. The secured creditor also has a limited perfected security interest
in proceeds that have been commingled with other funds. 58 The effect of
this revision is to make clear that the claim to cash allowed in
insolvency is exclusive of any other claim based on tracing.59 But
enforcement of Section 9-306(4)(d) has not been without problems.
Courts have not agreed upon the meaning of the language itself, and
trustees in bankruptcy continue to challenge the secured creditor's
claim under this provision on a variety of grounds. 60 Be aware that at
this point in the developnrient of the law under this provision, there are
serious questions as to what is the actual time period to use when
determining the amount of the commingled proceeds to which the
perfected secured creditor is due, and as to what actually constitutes the
cash proceeds that are to be used as the measuring stick to determine
the amount due the secured creditor.
Finally, Section 9-308 was modified to provide that the holder of a
negotiable instrument who might not qualify as a holder in due course
will still qualify for priority over a security interest holder in the
instrument that is perfected under either Section 9-304 (permissive
filing and temporary perfection) or under Section 9-306, if either the
holder acted without knowledge of the security interest or the security
57. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-306(4)(a), (b), and (c) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
58. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-306(4)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
59. REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-306.
60. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1013-17 (1980).
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interest is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory. The purpose of this
change is to bring negotiable instrument holders into parity with the
status enjoyed by chattel paper holders under both the Prior and
Revised Codes.
6 1
III. PRIORITIES
The Revised Code makes several significant changes in the priority
rules of Article 9. An understanding of those changes is of utmost
importance to the practitioner both in terms of correctly obtaining
priority status for secured creditors, and in properly interpreting the
status and rights of secured claims vis a vis other claimants.
"Lien creditors"6 2 who gain such a status before a security interest
is perfected now enjoy the same rights as perfected security interest
holders; Revised Code Section 9-301(1)(b) subordinates the unperfected
security interest but does not subordinate the secured debt to this lien.
6 3
Section 9-301(1)(b) of the Revised Code eliminates the provision that a
lien creditor could obtain priority over an unperfected security interest
only if the lien creditor lacked knowledge of the unperfected security
interest. The rationale for this change is that a lien creditor under the
Prior Code could become subordinated to an unperfected security
interest even though he had no knowledge when he extended credit but
"'acquired knowledge while attempting to extricate himself., 64 The
drafters reasoned that such a result was "completely inconsistent in
spirit with the rules of priority between security interests, where
61. REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-308.
62. Defined at MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-301(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980). There has
been considerable litigation involving the classification of parties within the narrow
definition of "lien creditor." See, e.g., Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Central Penn
Nat. Bank, 372 F. Supp. 1027, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 212 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (holder of temporary
restraining order found to be "lien creditor"); Copeland v. Stewart, 124 Cal. Rptr. 860, 18
U.C.C. Rep. 200 (1975) (judgment holders against payee on a note did not become "lien
creditors" by levying upon the makers of the note, and could only obtain that status by
levying upon the note); Madison National Bank v. Newarth, 261 Md. 321, 275 A.2d 495, 8
U.C.C. Rep. 1153 (1971) (holder of assignment in trust of a partnership interest in a
partnership as security for the indebtedness of assignor and corporation controlled by
assignor was not a "lien creditor" but a "secured party"); Estate of Hill, 27 Or. App. 893,
557 P.2d 1367, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1319 (1976) (personal representative of an estate is not a
"lien creditor" of the decedent, and cannot defeat claim of creditor holding an unperfected
security interest in net proceeds of a lawsuit); Meadows v. Bierchwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 16
U.C.C. Rep. 515 (Tex. 1975) (holder of "equitable right to a constructive trust" held to be a
"lien creditor").
63. Be aware that the ten-day grace period for filing provided for secured parties
under Prior Code Sections 9-301(2) and 9-301(2A) is retained in the Revised Code.
64. REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-301.
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knowledge plays a very minor role. 65 Moreover, the questions of what
information constituted "knowledge" and when "knowledge" could be
said to have existed frequently raised troublesome factual problems for
both the parties and the courts. 6
Maryland did not adopt Section 9-301(4) of the 1972 Official Text,
which would have given priority to future advances made under a
perfected security interest for forty-five days after the lien creditor came
into existence and thereafter if, when the secured creditor made such
advances or made commitments for such advances, he lacked knowledge
of the judgment lien.6 7 This provision would have been burdensome to
some secured lenders, since it would have had the direct effect of
requiring a lender contemplating making an advance on an already
perfected security interest to undertake judgment and lien checks prior
65. Id.
66. The courts have generally held that the burden of proof is not on the lien creditor
to prove his lack of knowledge, but rather upon the unperfected security interest holder to
establish the requisite knowledge of the lien creditor. See. e.g., Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Central Penn. Nat. Bank, 372 F. Supp. 1027, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 212 (E.D. Pa.
1974); In Re Komfro Products Corp., 247 F. Supp. 229, 2 U.C.C. Rep, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1965);
Levine v. Pascal, 94 Ill. App. 2d 43, 236 N.E.2d 425, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 344 (1968); ITT
Industrial Credit Co. v. Robinson, 350 So. 2d 48, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 841 (Miss. 1977); Kulik v.
Albers, Inc., 91 Nev. 134, 532 P.2d 603, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 859 (1975). However, the courts
have differed in determining what degree of "actual" as opposed to "constructive"
knowledge is required. Some courts have held that knowledge may not be imputed to the
lien creditor but indeed must be actual. See, e.g., In Re Dennis Mitchell Industries, Inc.,
419 F.2d 349, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 573 (3rd Cir. 1969) ("knowledge" as used in the U.C.C. means
"actual knowledge"); Fas-Pac, Inc. v. Fillingame, 123 Ga. App. 203, 180 S.E.2d 243, 8
U.C.C. Rep. 914 (1971) (knowledge of existence of note not sufficient to establish
knowledge of security interest in collateral listed on note); Whitmire v. Keylon, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 1203 (Tenn. App. 1973) (knowledge of the existence of a debt is alone not knowledge
of a secured debt); Clark Oil & Refining Co. v. Liddicoat, 65 Wis. 2d 612, 223 N.W.2d 530,
15 U.C.C. Rep. 1145 (1974) ("knowledge" as used in Section 9-301(1)(b) means "actual
knowledge," and it is irrelevant whether judgment creditor had reason to know
circumstances that should have reasonably prompted it to check beyond the filed record).
Other decisions indicate a willingness to apply a reasonableness standard in determining
when a prudent lien creditor possesses or should possess the requisite degree of
knowledge. See, e.g., Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc., 459 P.2d 467, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1262 (Alaska
1969) (failure of creditor to actually know of security interest does not prevent the creditor
from having imputed knowledge of the existence of the security interest); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Patchogue Truck & Equipment Co., 5 U.C.C. Rep. 1272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969)
(there was sufficient information on debtor's credit application from which creditor by
diligent inquiry could have obtained knowledge of security interest such that creditor
could be said to have had "knowledge" of the security interest).
67. This provision was primarily intended by the drafters to deal with the priority of
optional future advances over intervening Federal tax liens. As stated in the REASONS
FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-301, the forty-five day rule was believed "essential to
give the secured party the protection against Federal tax liens believed to have been
intended by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, the operation of which is made to depend on
state law."
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to each advance. As a practical matter, prudent lenders in significant
transactions frequently update lien and judgment searches as a matter
of course prior to making future advances, but Section 9-301(4) would
have mandated that this procedure be followed in order to ensure
protection in all instances.
Revised Code Section 9-312(7) provides a welcome resolution to a
previously troublesome question: to what extent do future advances
have priority over competing security interests? Simply stated, future
advances will relate back automatically to the priority status of the first
advance,68 and future advances made during a time period of temporary
perfection under Section 9-304 will have priority from the date of the
advance, unless the advance is made pursuant to a commitment.6 9
Revised Code Section 9-312(5) significantly changes the rule for
determining priorities between two competing security interest holders.
The rule under Prior Code Section 9-312(5) was that priority would be
granted to the first creditor to file if both creditors perfected by filing,
and that the first creditor to perfect would prevail if one creditor had
perfected by filing and one by possession. 70 The new rule of Section
9-312(5) is that the priority of competing security interests will be
determined by the first security interest to file or perfect.7 '
Example: Creditor 1 files, but does not advance. Creditor 2
thereafter files and advances. Creditor 1 then advances. Under both
the Prior Code and the Revised Code, Creditor 1 wins. But, if
Creditor 2 had perfected by possession instead of by filing, Creditor
2 would win under the Prior Code but would lose under the Revised
Code.
68. For an example of the application of Revised Code Section 9-312(7), see Provident
Finance Co. v. Beneficial Finance Co., 36 N.C. App. 401, 245 S.E.2d 510, 24 U.C.C. Rep.
1332 (1978).
69. The rationale of Revised Section 9-312(7) can be best explained as follows:
The theory here is that the intervening party is protected so long as he has notice of
the possible existence of a competing security interest in the collateral with which he
is concerned; thus, in a commercial world in which a creditor and debtor may typically
engage in a series of financial transactions involving the same collateral, the initial
creditor should not have to be concerned with repeated perfections of his continuing
security interest.
Coogan, supra note 1, at 511.
70. See, e.g., Household Finance Corp. v. Bank Comm'r of Maryland, 248
Md. 233, 235 A.2d 732 (1967) (a discussion of the operation of the former rule with
illustrative examples).
71. As explained in REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-312 n.4, the questions
of priority "have been the subject of an enormous legal literature." To settle these
questions, a unified rule of ranking priority in time was adopted in Section 9-312(5).
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As a practical matter, the procedures to be followed by secured creditors
and their counsel under the new priority rule will be the same.
Obviously, a search is necessary to verify the lack of any prior
conflicting financing statements, and creditors still must verify in
advance that only the debtor has possession of the subject collateral.
Additionally, advance filing of financing statements is still to be
recommended where debtor cooperation can be obtained.7 2
Revised Code Section 9-312(4) affirmatively resolves that the
priority of purchase money security interests in non-inventory collateral
extends not only to identifiable cash proceeds of that collateral but also
to all proceeds of that collateral.7 3
Example: Creditor 1 has a security interest in all equipment of
Debtor. Subsequently, Debtor buys new equipment from Creditor 2
who takes back a purchase money security interest in the new
equipment and properly perfects. Debtor later sells the equipment
and receives partial payment in cash with the remainder to be paid
on credit, which creates an "account." Creditor 2 prevails over
Creditor 1 with respect to priority in both the cash and the account.
Changes were made in Section 9-312(3) in order "to answer
unresolved questions under the 1962 Code."74 The new provision
recognizes "as sound" the preference of purchase money interests by
protecting the priority of purchase money creditors in inventory and in
identifiable cash proceeds received before delivery of the inventory to a
buyer over nonpurchase money interests, provided that certain notice
requirements are met.75 Specifically, the purchase money creditor must
give written notice76 to conflicting security interest holders of record
72. The mere filing of a financing statement clearly does not create any liabilities
against the borrower or alone establish a security interest. Land V. Company v. Asch, 267
Md. 251, 297 A.2d 285 (1972); Plemens v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 244 Md. 556, 224 A.2d 464
(1966).
73. The rationale for this change was explained by the drafters as follows:
Here, where it is not ordinarily expected that the collateral will be sold and that
proceeds will result, it seems appropriate to give the party having a purchase money
security interest in the original collateral an equivalent priority in its proceeds. The
1962 Code was unclear on this point.
REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-312 n.3.
74. REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-312 n.2.
75. Id.
76. The effect of the failure of a purchase money creditor to comply with these
requirements will be the clear forfeiture of whatever priority that creditor could have
obtained under Section 9-312(3). See, e.g., Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic National Bank
of Dallas, 557 F.2d 491, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 177 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 715, 26 U.C.C.
Rep. 1 (1979); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. First National Bank of Pipestone, 307
Minn. 20, 238 N.W,2d 612, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 526 (1976).
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within five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory,
which notice must state that the person giving notice has, or expects to
acquire, a purchase money security interest in the inventory of the
debtor. The notice must also describe the subject inventory by "item or
type."
As a practical matter, the bulk of the creditors that will be
receiving these notices will be creditors secured under after-acquired
property clauses. Such creditors are likely to find the notice require-
ments of Revised Code Section 9-312(3) to be of aid in monitoring and
policing the financial borrowing of their debtors, particularly where the
receipt of the notices actually serves to provide warnings of borrowing
that is in violation of the covenants of existing loan documentation
between the debtor and the creditor.
Revised Section 9-312(6) bridges the gap between the new proceeds
rules in Section 9-306 and the changed rules of priority contained in
Section 9-312(5) by providing that for priority purposes the date of
filing or perfection for collateral will also be the date of filing or
perfection for proceeds of the collateral. The drafters have called this the
"most debated subject under Article 9.,,77 The debate on this point
becomes particularly fierce over the natural competition between
inventory financers and accounts financers for priority in accounts
generated from the sale of inventory. Revised Code Section 9-312
resolves this issue by essentially promulgating a "first-to-file" rule.
Revised Section 9-312(5) establishes that if an accounts financer files
first, he will defeat a subsequent inventory financer. This rule even
applies in the purchase money situation, since the Section 9-312(3)
purchase money rights in proceeds are limited to "identifiable cash
proceeds,'8 and "accounts" of this type do not meet that definition.
Conversely, by operation of Revised Code Section 9-312(6), an inven-
tory financer that files ahead of an accounts financer will clearly have
priority over accounts generated from the sale of the inventory.
Accordingly, the time of filing is crucial in accounts receivable and
inventory financing, and must be monitored closely in order to ensure
priority.
77. REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-312 n.4. See Henson, Counter-
Suggestions Regarding Article 9: A Reply to Professor Kripke, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74 (1967);
Henson, Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 425
(1966); Kripke, Suggestions For Clarifying Article 9, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687 (1966).
78. The term "cash proceeds" is defined at MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-306(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1980).
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IV. FILING REQUIREMENT CHANGES
Although the changes in filing requirements made by the'Revised
Code are undoubtedly less esoteric than some of the other changes to the
Code, they should be of tremendous importance to the practitioner who
wants to perfect security interests by filing. Most of these changes are
pragmatic in nature and clearly were intended to simplify the
procedures of filing and to eliminate areas of uncertainty and dispute
that existed under the 1962 Official Text.
The Revised Code makes a number of changes in the formal
requisites of financing statements and their amendments. Revised Code
Section 9-402(1) changes the signature requirements for filing by
providing that only the debtor need sign the financing statement. This
change from the previous requirement that both the secured party and
debtor had to sign the financing statement was meant to eliminate
misunderstandings arising with secured parties who were accustomed to
pre-U.C.C. practices and to real estate practices under which only the
debtor signed chattel mortgages and real estate mortgages. 79 This
modification permits security agreements, which only have to be signed
by the debtor,80 to be recorded as financing statements, provided that
the security agreement contains the information otherwise required by
Revised Code Section 9-402(1) for financing statements.8 1
Section 9-402(2) has been revised and new situations have been
added in which it is sufficient for only the secured party to sign the
financing statement. All of these situations involve previously existing
security interests where common sense and expediency dictate that
there is no need to once again obtain the debtor's signature. The first
addition involves changes in location by the debtor to Maryland when
the collateral was already subject to the secured party's security interest
in another jurisdiction. It should be noted that the financing statement
must recite "that the debtor's location was changed to this State under
such circumstances."8 2 Secondly, only the secured party need sign where
the original filing has lapsed. Note that perfection nevertheless will
79. REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-402.
80. See MD. COM. LAW. CODE ANN. § 9-203 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
81. This is not a significant change from the Prior Code since it was permissible
under the Prior Code Section 9-402(1) to file security agreements as financing statements,
if all the requirements of a financing statement were met, which, of course, included the
signatures of both the debtor and the secured party. Plemens v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 244
Md. 556, 224 A.2d 464, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1017 (1966). Note that conditional sales contracts
offered for re-recordation on or after the effective date of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
have been treated as satisfactorily serving as financing statements if they otherwise met
the requirements of a financing statement. 49 Op. Md. Atty. Gen. 106 (1964).
82. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-402(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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have been terminated retroactively, and the secured party will be
perfected only from the date that the new financing statement is filed.
The last of the new situations where only the secured party need sign
the financing statement involves the collateral acquired after a change
of name, identity, or corporate structure of the debtor.
A much needed clarification in the area of correctly expressing the
debtor's name has been added by Revised Code Section 9-402(7).
Considerable litigation was engendered by the lack of specificity in the
Prior Code as to exactly what names should be used on financing
statements in situations involving partnerships and sole proprietorships
operating under trade names.13 Revised Code Section 9-402(7) explicit-
ly provides that financing statements sufficiently state the debtor's
name if they provide the individual, partnership, or corporate name of
the debtor, regardless of whether trade names84 or names of partners
are stated. As a practical matter, prudent creditors should still file not
only under the individual, partnership, or corporate name, but also
under trade names and partners' names, where they are not too
numerous to be impractical, since the additional recordation costs are
insignificant, and the secured party will generally want to make it as
easy as possible for potential conflicting security interest holders and
other creditors or purchasers to ascertain the existence of the filing.
8 5
Section 9-402(7) of the Revised Code also provides that where a
debtor changes its name, identity, or corporate structure such that a
then currently filed financing statement becomes "seriously mislead-
ing," the existing filing will not be effective to perfect a security interest
83. The courts have tended to adopt one of two opposite approaches to this question.
Many decisions reflect a very strict approach to the application of the requirements of
Section 9-402 and have vigorously invalidated financing statements filed solely under
trade names, finding that such filings do not accurately reflect the legally correct name of
the debtor. See, e.g., In Re James Wells Enterprises, Inc., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 900 (D. Fla.,
Bankr. J. 1977) (financing statement that identified debtor only by trade name was
insufficient to perfect security interest even though it was signed in the correct legal name
of debtor). Other courts however, have taken a broader and more practical approach to this
question and have determined the issue by analyzing whether a searcher of the records
could effectively locate the transaction, even if the filing was under a trade name, and not
the legally correct name of the debtor. See, e.g., In Re Platt, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 275 (E.D. Pa.
1966), vacated on other grounds, 257 F. Supp. 478, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 719 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(filing in trade name of "Platt Fur Company" instead of name and individual debtor
"Henry Platt" was effective filing).
84. The 1972 OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 3, at § 9-407 comment 7, state that the
rationale for the lack of reliance upon trade names the 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT is, "rtlrade
names are deemed to be too uncertain and too likely not to be known to the secured party
or person searching the record, to form the basis for a filing system."
85. Pursuant to the provisions of MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-403(5) (Cum. Supp.
1980), the fees for recordation are as stated in MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 7-202
(1980).
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in collateral subsequently acquired by the debtor unless a new financing
statement reflecting the change is filed within the four month period
following the change.86 The "seriously misleading" test has, as one
would imagine, stimulated a considerable amount of litigation in
determining the application of this term, and generally the courts have
taken a common sense approach. 7 However, Revised Code Section
9-402(7) does provide that a filed financing statement remains effective
with respect to collateral transferred by the debtor even though the
secured party knows of or consents to the transfer.8 8 Nevertheless,
despite this broad protective language, it is suggested that practitioners
refile under the transferee's name. Moreover, this provision illustrates
86. The operation of this section and the burdens placed upon the secured creditor
were particularly well delineated by the court in the case of In re Taylorville Eisner
Agency, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 665, 668, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 241, 244-45 (1977):
The secured party must determine whether the filed financing statement has
become seriously misleading. If so, the filing is not effective to perfect a security
interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the change
unless a new appropriate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that
time. There is no knowledge requirement included in the sentence. That means that
from the time a change occurs which makes the financing statement misleading there
must be a refiling within four months. The burden of realizing a change has occurred,
checking the effect the change has on the financing statement, and filing a new
financing statement within four months if necessary, is upon the secured party.
87. The "seriously misleading" test is not new and appears under both the Prior Code
(Section 9-402(5)) and the Revised Code (Section 9-402(8)) in connection with curative
provisions. These sections provide that financial statements substantially complying with
the requirements of Section 9-402 are sufficient to constitute valid filings even if such
financing statements contain "minor errors which are not seriously misleading." The use
of the term "seriously misleading" under Revised Section 9-402(7) with respect to name
and organizational changes is a natural extension of the term's use. The courts have
generally interpreted the test to require as basic whether a searcher of the financing
statement records can still readily retrieve the financing statement after the change. See,
e.g., In re Kittyhawk Television Corp., 516 F.2d 24, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1401 (6th Cir. 1975)
(debtor's name change from "Kittyhawk Broadcasting Corporation" to "Kittyhawk
Television Corporation" held sufficiently similar that a searcher could reasonably be
expected to be put on notice or at least be required to make further inquiry); Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe City National Bank, 544 S.W.2d 947, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 631 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976) (change from "Nations' David Brown Tractor Company" to "Nations'
Tractor Company" not seriously misleading).
88. For an example of the operation of this provision, see In re Ocean Electronics
Corp., 451 F. Supp. 511, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 749 (S.D. Cal. 1978). But see In re Conger Printing
Co., Inc., 18 U.C.C. Rep. 224 (D. Or., Bankr. J. 1975) (Section 9-402(7) does not
automatically eliminate the need to reperfect where both a name change and an
authorized transfer of collateral from the debtor to an "in house" corporation formed by
debtor result in filing to become inaccurate; if inaccuracy results from agreed authoriza-
tion, which precedes the filing of the financing statement, the good-faith obligations of
Section 1-203 require the secured party to file or refile to avoid misleading other creditors
of debtor).
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the wisdom of obtaining representations from debtors as to all names
used within the last twelve years and the need for checking the
financing statement records with respect to those names.
A troublesome area for secured lenders now exists under the new
requirements of Section 9-402(7). A substantial burden is placed upon
lenders with floating liens on after-acquired property to continually
monitor their debtors and detect any changes that render financing
statements already on file "seriously misleading." The failure to detect
such changes and to refile within the four month time period has the
direct and automatic effect of invalidating the security interest of the
secured party for property acquired after that date. The following
examples illustrate this problem:
Example: Creditor 1 makes a loan to Debtor, secured into existing
and after-acquired inventory. Debtor then changes its name in a
"seriously misleading" manner. Five months later Debtor borrows
from Creditor 2, who secures into the Debtor's inventory. Unless
Creditor 1 has filed a new financing statement, his interest will be
unperfected as to all inventory acquired four months after the
Debtor's name change, and Creditor 1 will lose to Creditor 2, if
Creditor 2 has priority either through filing or perfection.
Example: X Corp. borrows from Creditor 1 and gives a security
interest in all existing and after-acquired equipment. X Corp.
merges with Y Corp. and the successor is Y Corp. (whose name is a
"seriously misleading" change). Y Corp. borrows from Creditor 2,
and gives a security interest in the same equipment. Creditor 1 is
perfected as to existing equipment and to the equipment acquired
up to four months after the merger. It will not be perfected with
respect to equipment acquired thereafter, unless a new financing
statement is filed.
Obviously, lenders must vigorously police their debtors and must be
sensitive to any changes in the names of their debtors. Prudent lenders
will not guess as to what constitutes a "seriously misleading" change,
and should interpret conservatively most changes in names as meeting
that test, and thus should file a new, updated financing statement
within the four month period. As a policy decision, this change in
Article 9 is sensible and reasonable since subsequent lenders should
have the opportunity either to be able to detect the existence of existing
security interests or to be able to rely upon the absence of any filings
indexed under the debtor's names.
Prior Code Section 9-403(2) provided that where a maturity date of
less than twelve years was actually stated on the financing statement,
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then the financing statement was effective only until sixty days after
the maturity date. The Revised Code makes a minor change by deleting
any reference to earlier maturity dates and by providing that every
financing statement is effective for a period of twelve years.8 9 As a
practical matter, this change will have little effect on most practitioners
since existing practice is such that financing statements rarely state a
maturity date.
Under Revised Code Section 9-403(2), a continuation statement
must be filed before the expiration of the twelve-year period if
continuation of the security interest is desired. Resolving an issue of
considerable dispute, Revised Code Section 9-403(2) further provides
that if a lapse of the security interest does in fact occur, then the
security interest is to be considered as unperfected vis a vis purchasers
or lien creditors of the collateral who became such before the lapse.9"
Note, however, that Revised Code Section 9-403(6) has special rules for
transmitting utilities 9 1 and for situations involving the use of real
estate mortgages (and deeds of trust)9 2 as filings for perfection into
fixtures. If the debtor is a transmitting utility, the filing is effective
until a termination statement is filed. Where a mortgage is serving as a
financing statement for fixtures, it will be effective until the mortgage
is released.
Revised Code Section 9-403(2) further clarifies the filing require-
ments with respect to debtors involved in insolvency proceedings by
providing that if a security interest perfected by filing exists at the time
insolvency proceedings are commenced, it remains perfected until the
later of (i) the expiration of sixty days after the termination of the
insolvency proceedings, or (ii) the date when the security interest would
otherwise have lapsed.9 3
89. The rationale for this change is that it facilitates renewals or extensions "without
the danger of the financing statement ceasing to be effective." REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra
note 3, at § 9-403.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Squires, 378 F. Supp. 798, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 718 (S.D.
Iowa 1974).
91. Defined at MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-105(1)(n) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
92. Defined at MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-105(1)j) (Cum. Supp. 1980) as: A
consensual interest created by a real estate mortgage, a trust deed on real estate, or the
like (emphasis added).
93. The basis for this change is explained succinctly by the drafters of the 1972
OFFICIAL TEXT as follows:
Subsection (2) also recognizes that financing statements might expire during an
insolvency proceeding. While the prevailing line of decisions is to the effect that the
situation is frozen at the moment of bankruptcy without an obligation to refile, there
are contrary decisions, and this situation might prove an inadvertent trap to a secured
party who failed to refile or file a continuation statement during a bankruptcy. The
change continues the validity of the financing statement until the end of the
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As a common sense accommodation to secured lenders, Revised
Code Section 9-402(1) provides that photocopies of financing statements
may be filed if the security agreement so provides or if the original has
already been filed in Maryland. As a practical matter, practitioners
should routinely include such a provision in security agreements.
However, it is puzzling as to how the filing officers are to know, without
reviewing the security agreement or ascertaining the existence of prior
filing in Maryland, if the filing should be accepted.
Revised Section 9-404(1) adds a requirement that with respect to
financing statements covering consumer goods filed on or after January
1, 1981, a secured party must file termination statements within one
month or within ten days of written demand by the debtor after the
obligation of the consumer has been satisfied and no security interest is
further claimed.94 With respect to commercial debtors, the rule remains
the same as under the Prior Code, such that the secured party's duty to
supply a termination statement is triggered only by demand therefor by
the debtor.s5
Lessors and consignors often encounter disputes as to whether a
particular transaction is a "true lease" 96 or "true consignment"97 as
insolvency proceedings and for 60 days thereafter, or until the expiration of the
five-year period, whichever is later. Ordinarily, if the secured party expects that the
secured debt may continue in existence after the end of the insolvency proceedings, he
should file a continuation statement on the normal schedule, to preserve the filing for
the use at the end of the insolvency proceeding and to preclude any discontinuity of
the filings.
REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-403.
94. It should be noted that Revised Section 9-404(1) provides that if the secured
creditor fails to file a termination statement as required, e.g., within ten days after
demand by the debtor, "he shall be liable to the debtor for one hundred dollars, and in
addition for any loss caused to the debtor by such failure." Obviously, practitioners should
educate their clients as to their obligations under this Section and help to develop
procedures which efficiently dispatch termination statements on a timely basis. It should
also be noted that the mere filing of the termination statement is sufficient compliance,
and the consumer debtor need not be actually advised of the filing. Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Gibson, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 1038 (Ky. App. 1977).
95. The distinction between the consumer goods situation and commercial debtors
and the imposition of a mandatory affirmative obligation upon secured parties in the
consumer situation is made because many consumers will not realize the importance of
clearing the situation as it appears on file. Therefore, an affirmative duty is put on the
secured party in that case. 1972 OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 3, at § 9-404 comment 1.
96. The leading case in Maryland on this subject is Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v.
Atlantic Mobile Corporation, 252 Md. 286, 250 A.2d 246 (1969), where the Court of
Appeals adopted the following considerations and factors in determining when a "lease in
form is a lease in fact or a security instrument:"
1. The facts in each case control to show intention of the parties to create a
security interest.
2. Reservation of title in a lease or option to purchase appurtenant to or
included in the lease does not in and of itself make the lease a security agreement.
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opposed to a financing arrangement structured in form to appear as a
lease or a consignment. Frequently, this question involves a close
factual determination, and it is devastating if the arrangement is found
to be a financing arrangement instead of a consignment or lease, and
the consignor or leasor has not properly filed.9 s Typically, prudent
lessors and consignors in the past have routinely filed as a precaution-
ary measure. Frequently, such financing statements have contained
disclaimer language to the effect that the parties believe the transaction
to be a "true lease" or "true consignment" and that the filing is being
made only as a notice and precautionary measure. In order to eliminate
this problem, and to avoid the question of whether such a precautionary
filing can be construed as an admission that a true lease or true
consignment is actually a sham financing arrangement, 99 Revised Code
Section 9-408 expressly provides that a consignor or lessor of goods may
3. Lease agreement which permits the lessee to become the owner at the end of
the term of the lease for a nominal or for no additional consideration is deemed
intended as a security agreement as a matter of law.
4. The percentage that option purchase price bears to the list price, especially if
it is less than 25%, is to be considered as showing the intent of the parties to make a
lease as security.
5. Where the terms of the lease and option to purchase are such that the only
sensible course for the lessee at the end of the lease term is to exercise the option and
become the owner of the goods, the lease was intended to create a security interest.
6. The character of a transaction as a true lease is indicated by:
(a) Provision specifying purchase option price which is approximately the
market value at the time of the exercise of the option.
(b) Rental charges indicating an intention to compensate lessor for loss of
value over the term of the lease due to aging, wear and obsolescence.
(c) Rentals which are not excessive and option purchase price which is not
too low.
(d) Facts showing that the lessee is acquiring no equity in leased article
during the term of lease.
Id. at 289, 250 A.2d at 248.
97. For an excellent discussion of the law governing consignments, see Duesenberg,
Consignments Under the UCC: A Comment on Emerging Principles, 26 Bus. LAW. 565
(1970). See also Columbia International Corp. v. Kempler, 46 Wis. 2d 550, 175 N.W.2d
465, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 650 (1970) (an example of an application of a functional analysis for the
determination of when a consignment is a security device only).
98. See, e.g., Clark Oil & Refining Co. v. Liddicoat, 65 Wis. 2d 612, 223 N.W.2d 530,
15 U.C.C. Rep. 1145 (1974) (where gasoline was furnished to gasoline dealer on a
"consignment" basis with no U.C.C. filings, the arrangement was found to be intended for
security purposes with the result that an intervening judgment creditor who attached on
the goods prevailed over the "consignor").
99. Most courts that have considered this question under the 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT
have held that such a filing by itself will not be determinative of whether a lease is
intended for security. See, e.g., In re Lockwood, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 195 (Ref. D. Conn. 1974); In
re Universal Medical Serv., Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. 614 (Ref. E.D. Pa. 1970). But see In re
Lakeshore Transit-Kenosha, Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rep. 607 (Ref. E.D. Wis. 1969).
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file a financing statement using the terms "consignor," "consignee,"
"lessor," "lessee," or the like, and that such a filing "shall not of itself be
a factor in determining whether or not the consignment or lease is
intended as security." Accordingly, there now exists no good reason to
avoid such filings, and due care and common sense dictate that lessors
and consignors routinely make these filings using the appropriate
designations.
V. CONSIGNMENTS
In order to resolve the questions of filing requirements arising from
the inevitable conflicts between inventory lenders and consignment
suppliers of goods, an entirely new Section 9-114 has been enacted in
the Revised Code. This new Section gives priority to the person who
delivers goods under "a consignment which is not a security interest"
(i.e., a "true" consignment) and who would be required to file under
Section 2-326(3)(c) over the secured creditors of the consignee in the
goods and in the identifiable cash proceeds thereof if various procedures
are followed. These procedures closely parallel those imposed upon
purchase money financing under Revised Section 9-312(3).1o Simply
stated, the consignor must file a financing statement 10 1 before the
consignee receives possession of the goods; the consignor must give
notification in writing to the holders of any previously filed conflicting
security interests, stating that the consignor expects to deliver goods on
consignment to the consignee, which notification must describe the
goods by item or type; and the holders of any conflicting security
interests must receive the notification within five years before the
consignee receives the goods. Although it is clear that Article 9 applies
to consignments intended for security, 1 2 it should be noted that the
filing requirements of Revised Section 9-114 apply even to a true
consignment if the person delivering the goods would be required to file
by Section 2-326(3)(c).10 3
100. See notes 74 to 76 and accompanying text supra.
101. See MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 9-402 and 9-408 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
102. See MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 9-102(2) and 1-201(37) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
103. The rationale for this requirement was stated by the drafters of the 1972 OFFICIAL
TEXT as follows:
An uncertainty has existed under the 1962 Code whether the filing rule in Section
2-326(3) applicable to true consignments requires only filing under Part 4 of Article 9
or also requires notice to prior inventory secured parties of the debtor under Section
9-312(3). The new Section 9-114 accepts the latter view, and provides in substance
that, in order to protect his ownersfiip of the consigned goods, the consignor must give
the same notice to an inventory secured party of the debtor that he would have to give
if his transaction with the consignee was in the form of a security transaction instead
of in the form of a consignment.
REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-114.
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With the changes made by the Revised Code, it is important that
consignors file financing statements as insurance. The effect of failure
to comply with Revised Section 9-114 is catastrophic to consignors,
since Revised Section 9-114(2) expressly provides that where these
requirements have not been met, a person who delivers goods to another
on consignment is subordinate to a person who would have a perfected
security interest in the goods if they were the property of the debtor.
VI. CHANGES RELATING TO AGRICULTURE
The Revised Code contains several minor but important changes to
the law governing agricultural financing. The Revised Code eliminates
the one-year limit on after-acquired crop financing contained in Prior
Section 9-204(4)(a),' 0 4 the automatic perfection provisions relating to
farm equipment costing less than $500 contained in Prior Section
9-302(1)(c), 1 0 5 and the provision of Prior Section 9-307(2) that farmers
who purchased equipment in which automatic perfection had occurred
took free of the security interest.
The problem of ascertaining the "residence" of a farm operation
spread over several counties is resolved by the provisions in Revised
Section 9-401(6) that the "residence" will be "its place of business if it
has one or its chief executive office if it has more than one place of
business." However, multiple filings still should be made where
practical since the determination of the "chief executive office" involves
a factual determination, and multiple filings would introduce more
certainty into the transaction for the secured lender. Finally, Revised
Section 9-301(1)(c) provides priority to a buyer of farm products in the
104. The former one-year limitation was an attempt by the drafters of the 1962
OFFICIAL TEXT to deal with the "seed loan" problem farmers face in buying seed and
fertilizer for their crops. As Professor Hawkland has observed, the reasoning for this
provision was that a farmer "could become a peon if he were able to encumber his crops for
years to come." Hawkland, The Proposed Amendment to Article 9 of the U.C.C. - Part 1:
Financing the Farmer, 76 COM. L.J. 416, 421 (1971). However, this provision did not work
to accomplish that purpose since:
there was no corresponding limit on the scope of a financing statement covering crops,
and under the Code's notice-filing rules the priority position of a security arrange-
ment covering successive crops would be as effectively protected by the filing of a first
financing statement whether the granting clause was in one security agreement with
an after-acquired property clause or in a succession of security agreements.
REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-204. See, e.g., United States v. Minster Farmers
Cooperative Exchange, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 566, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1439 (N.D. Ohio, 1977);
United States v. Gleaners & Farmers Cooperative Elevator Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep. 13 (N.D.
Ind. 1970).
105. The practical effect of Prior Section 9-302(1)(c) was actually detrimental to
farmers since the fear of "hidden liens" was such that farmers' equipment became
generally unacceptable as collateral. See REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-302.
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ordinary course of business vis a vis an unperfected security interest in
such products, to the extent that the buyer gives value and receives
delivery of the farm products without knowledge of the security interest
and before it is perfected.
VII. DEFINITIONAL TERMINOLOGY CHANGES
The Revised Code contains some changes in basic terminology, as
well as the addition of various definitions. One of the more significant
changes in terminology is the elimination of the term "contract right"
from Article 9. Section 9-106 of the Prior Code defined "contract right"
to include any right to payment under a contract that has not yet been
earned by performance and that is not evidenced by an instrument or
chattel paper. A distinction was made between "contract rights" and
"accounts," and once performance was completed, the collateral was no
longer a "contract right" but became an "account.' 1 6 This distinction
has been eliminated completely by the Revised Code. The very existence
of the term "contract rights" lead to confusion in proceeds situations
where contract rights became an account by performance, since the
Prior Code provided that there could be no right in an account until it
came into existence. As a result, frequent mistakes were made in
collateral descriptions in financing statements by the claiming of
"accounts" or "general intangibles" when, before performance, the
description should properly have been "contract rights.' 7 The term is
now more simply subsumed in Revised Section 9-106 with its expanded
definition of "accounts."
An ambiguity that existed under the Prior Code has been elimin-
ated by the express exclusion in Revised Section 9-106 of the term
"money"' 0' from the definition of "general intangibles." This change
was made in order to preclude the argument that a security interest in
money can be perfected by filing.'0 9 Section 9-104, delineating those
transactions excluded from Title 9, also has been revised. The former
106. In re C.E. Pantz & Son, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1120 (E.D. Pa., Ref. 1967), aff'd, 2
U.C.C. Rep. 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1965); E. Turgeon Construction Co., Inc. v. Elhatton Plumbing
& Heating Co., Inc., 10 R.I. 303, 292 A.2d 230, 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1353 (1972).
107. See, e.g., Cissell v. First National Bank of Cincinnati, 27 U.C.C. Rep. 1385 (S.D.
Ohio 1976) (advance tuition payments made by students in connection with proposed
travel courses in Europe were contract rights and not accounts in that total service
contracted for had not been rendered; accordingly, description of collateral in financing
statement as "accounts receivable" was not sufficient to perfect a security interest in
contract rights that had not yet ripened into accounts).
108. Defined at MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 1-201(24) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
109. REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-106.
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exemption for railway financing on rolling stock has 'been removed, with
the effect that railway financing is now within the scope of Article 9.
Even so, the filing provisions of Article 9 still do not control with respect
to such collateral, and instead secured parties should continue to file in
compliance with the central filing provisions of the Interstate Com-
merce Act. Revised Section 9-104(e) expressly excludes transfers by
government or governmental subdivisions or agencies from the coverage
of Article 9. Revised Section 9-104(f) specifically excludes from Article
9 "a transfer of a single account to an assignee in whole or partial
satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness." This exclusion is sensible
since such transactions clearly are not in reality commercial financing
situations. Section 9-104(g) continues to exclude transfers of an interest
in insurance policies from Article 9 coverage, but makes clear that
Article 9 applies as provided in Section 9-306 with respect to insurance
proceeds and in Section 9-312 with respect to priorities in such
proceeds. Section 9-104(h) continues to provide that Article 9 does not
apply to a right represented by a judgment, but the Revised Code adds
that Article 9 does apply to a judgment taken on a right to payment
which was collateral (e.g., an account receivable). "Deposit account" is
defined in Revised Section 9-105(1)(e) as meaning "a demand, time,
savings, passbook or like account maintained with a bank, savings and
loan association, credit union or like organization, other than an
account evidenced by a certificate of deposit."
VIII. FIXTURES
Perhaps the most sweeping changes advocated for Article 9 under
the proposed 1972 Official Text deal with the provisions concerning
fixtures." 0 In an attempt to grapple with various priority problems that
110. Section 9-313(1) as retained in the Revised Code provides "The law of this State
other than Title 1 through 10 of this article determines whether and when other goods
become fixtures." Although the case law defining what exactly constitutes a fixture is, at
best, murky, the most frequently cited Maryland definition is enunciated in the leading
case of Dudley v. Hurst, 67 Md. 44, 8 A. 901 (1887), as follows:
The term "fixture" is generally used in reference to some originally personal chattel
which has been actually or constructively affixed either to the soil itself, or some
structure legally a part of such soil. The tests by which a fixture is determined are
generally these:
(1) Annexation to the realty, either actual or constructive;
(2) adaptation to the use of that part of the realty with which it is connected;
(3) the intention of the party making the annexation to make the article a
permanent accession to the freehold, this intention being inferred from the nature of
the article annexed, the situation of the party making the annexation, the mode of
annexation, and the purpose for which it was annexed.
Id. at 47, 8 A. at 902. As a matter of good practice, prudence and care dictate that secured
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had arisen in this area, major changes were made to the 1962 Official
Text."1 Unfortunately, Maryland adopted only minor portions of the
provision contained in the proposed 1972 amendments for fixtures, and
disappointingly, did not adopt the major substantive proposals altering
priority rules.
Maryland did, however, make some minor changes, largely of a
technical nature, in fixtures financing. Section 9-402(5) of the Revised
Code continues the requirement of Prior Section 9-402(6) that a
financing statement relating to fixtures must state that it is to be
recorded in the land records. Revised Section 9-402(5) further provides
that the financing statement must show that it covers "this type of
collateral" and must contain a "description of the real estate."'112 If the
debtor does not have an interest of record in the real estate, for example,
a lessee under an unrecorded lease, the financing statement must
indicate the name of the record owner. In addition, Revised Section
9-402(9) requires that any financing statement tendered for filing in
Baltimore City, or in any county that maintains a block system for the
recordation of papers in the land records, must contain in the
description of real estate the house number and street, if any, or the
appropriate block reference. As a result of these requirements, the
prudent lender perfecting into fixtures should perform an abbreviated
title search to obtain accurate record ownership, particularly when the
debtor is a lessee. Although it is clear that complete "legal descriptions"
are not required by Section 9-402(5), prudence dictates that "legal
parties, when in doubt as to whether the collateral is a fixture, utilize both types of filing
(fixture and non-fixture).
For an excellent general discussion of the Maryland law governing fixtures, see
Stiller, The Maryland Law of Fixtures, 25 MD. L. REV. 21 (1965).
111. Professor Hawkland has stated that dissatisfaction with the handling of fixtures
under the 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT was "a major reason" for the establishment of the Review
Committee to study Article 9 and to make recommendations for improvement. Hawkland,
The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC - Part 3: Fixtures, 77 COM. L.J. 416
(1972).
112. The crucial test in determining whether the description is adequate is whether it
is sufficient to permit location of the filing by a search of the land records. See, e.g.,
Corning Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 575 S.W.2d 949, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 1367 (1979)
(court held that a name and address alone, when the address is a post-office box number, is
too uncertain to be a proper description; instead, the court found that the description must
refer "to something tangible by which the property can be located."). It should be noted
that Maryland did not adopt optional suggested language, proposed in the 1972 OFFICIAL
TEXT for Section 9-402(5), that the description of the real estate be "sufficient if it were
contained in a mortgage of the real estate to give constructive notice of the mortgage
under the law of the state." This optional language was designed by the drafters "to meet
the objection as to real estate descriptions but without imposing on afixture-secured party
the duty of obtaining a 'legal description' unless the state's recording system requires it."
REASONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 3, at § 9-402.
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descriptions" be obtained and used in order to eliminate any possible
confusion. This requirement does not impose any particular or un-
reasonable burden upon lenders, and is an excellent safeguard to ensure
that the perfected security interest will be correctly revealed in the
record owner's chain of title.
Revised Section 9-402(6) makes a common sense adjustment to the
prior law in that it permits the use of a mortgage as a financing
statement covering goods that are, or are to become, fixtures. However,
any mortgage used as a financing statement must describe the
particular goods by "item or type," be duly recorded in the appropriate
land records, and comply with all of the requirements for a financing
statement other than a recital that it is to be recorded in the land
records. The practitioner should note this last requirement mandates
that the mortgage or deed of trust must contain the address of the
secured party." 3 Revised Section 9-403(6) further provides that such a
mortgage, when serving double duty as a financing statement, remains
effective in perfecting the security interest until released or satisfied of
record or otherwise terminated, thus relieving secured parties of the
need under such circumstances to file continuation statements.
Any treatment of fixture financing under the Revised Code
necessitates a brief discussion of the drastically altered priority analysis
of proposed Section 9-313, which was rejected by the Maryland General
Assembly and was not adopted. This rejected priority approach focuses
specifically upon the potential competing interests that exist between
interests secured into the real estate (particularly construction loans)
and interests secured into the goods that are to become fixtures. The
priority analysis retained in Maryland focuses on the time of attach-
ment of the security interest in relation to the time of affixation of the
goods to the realty - the so called pre-affixation and post-affixation
analysis. 
114
Basically, a pre-affixation security interest is one that attaches to
the goods before the goods are affixed to the real estate. Accordingly,
under Section 9-313, pre-affixation security interests have priority over
all existing interest in the real estate, even if the pre-affixation security
interests are not perfected. Moreover, pre-affixation security interests
have priority over subsequent real estate interests if they are perfected
by filing or if the subsequent interest holders have knowledge of the
pre-affixation security interests.
A post-affixation security interest is one that attaches to the goods
after the goods are affixed to the real estate. The basic rule stated in
113. See MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-402 (Cum. Supp. 1980.
114. See Stiller, supra note 110, for a discussion of this analysis.
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Section 9-313(3) is that the existing interests in the real estate have
priority over post-affixation security interests even if the post-affixation
security interest is perfected, unless the holder of the interest in the real
estate has consented in writing to the security interest or disclaims an
interest in the goods as fixtures.11 An example of such a consent would
be the common procedure followed by most practitioners of obtaining
"Landlord's Waivers" which typically consent to and acknowledge the
priority of security interests. However, subsequent interests in real
estate do not have priority over a post-affixation security interest if the
security interest is in fact perfected. Section 9-313(4) provides,
however, that unless the security interest is perfected, the security
interest is subordinate to subsequent purchasers for value, subsequent
judgment lienors, and any prior mortgagee to the extent that the prior
mortgagee makes subsequent advances (e.g., construction lenders
advancing under a draw schedule) unless such person had knowledge of
the security interest."
6
The proposed amendments to Section 9-313 found in the 1972
Official Text abandon the strict pre-affixation/post-affixation analysis,
and instead substitute a first-to-file rule with special priority given to
purchase money security interests in fixtures, and super priority given
to construction lenders. Generally, the proposed scheme of the 1972
Official Text provides, under proposed Section 9-313(4), that the first
party to file notice of his interest, be it a security or a real estate
interest, has a priority position. However, this general rule is abrogated
under proposed Section 9-313(4)(a) to the extent that a purchase money
security interest exists in a fixture and that interest is perfected before
the goods become fixtures or within ten days after affixation. In such a
case, the purchase money security interest has priority over any prior
real estate interests.
Proposed Section 9-313(6) establishes a super priority for construc-
tion lenders. Essentially, this provision provides that the exception to
the general rule for purchase money security interests in fixtures does
not defeat a construction mortgage recorded before the goods become
115. It has been held that "an express agreement" is required and that a "general
consent to improvement and remodeling" is not sufficient to serve as such a consent or
disclaimer. In re Seminole Park and Fairgrounds, Inc., 502 F.2d 1015, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 946
(5th Cir. 1974).
116. Under MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 1-201(25) a person "knows" or "has
knowledge" of a fact when "he has actual knowledge of it." See, e.g., Northwest Equipment
Sales Co. v. Western Packers, Inc., 543 F.2d 65, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 210 (9th Cir. 1976)
(subsequent purchaser for value does not obtain priority if he had actual knowledge of
previous fixture-secured interest even if his predecessor had been without knowledge).
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fixtures regardless of the timing of the advance under the construction
mortgage.
It should be noted that the Maryland State Bar Association's
Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code vigorously opposed the
1972 Official Text's proposed priority approach."17 The Committee
believed that construction lenders were more capable of policing debtors
than were purchase money fixture financers, and a construction
mortgage financer is better able to adjust to priorities for purchase
money fixture financing than the latter is able to adjust to a priority for
construction financing."' Thus, the Committee was reluctant to provide
construction financing with a priority over purchase money fixture
financing.
IX. REMEDIES
The proposed 1972 Official Text contains several changes in the
Article 9 provisions relating to remedies, but Maryland rejected the
changes that were substantive in nature. One minor change that was
adopted is found in Revised Section 9-504(1)(a), which now clarifies
that the distribution priority accorded to reasonable expenses of
disposing of collateral after default includes charges incurred in either
the leasing of the collateral or in the preparation of the collateral for
leasing. This is a welcome change, and in fact reflects a situation in
which secured lenders involved in equipment financing sometimes find
themselves: occasionally it is necessary to lease repossessed collateral
on an interim basis prior to sale or other disposition. Of course, the
proceeds derived therefrom directly inure to the debtor's benefit in
reducing the amount of the debtor's liability for outstanding debt and
expense.
Maryland did not adopt the proposed change to Section 9-504 that
would have altered the notice requirements stated in that provision.
117. See Leitess, Proposed Changes In Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code by its
Permanent Editorial Board, MD. B.J., Apr. 1972, at 29, July 1972, at 16.
118. Specifically, the Committee stated:
It is the opinion of the Bar Committee that the proposed preference for construction
mortgages undermines the general philosophic underpinnings of 9-313. Obviously,
construction mortgage financing, which is generally long-term financing, is better
able to adjust to a priority given to purchase money fixture financing than for the
latter, which is generally short-term financing, to adjust to a priority given to the
former.
Leitess, supra note 117, July 1972 at 19.
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Under Section 9-504(3), unchanged by the 1981 revisions, the debtor 119
must be given reasonable notice of the time and place of any public sale
or the time after which any private sale is to be made. 120 The proposed
amendment permits the secured party to obtain a post-default, but not
pre-default, waiver by the debtor of this notice. Unfortunately, this
proposed amendment was not adopted. Frequently, it becomes necessary
for the secured creditor in possession of repossessed collateral to obtain
a rapid sale of the collateral. Debtors often wish to expedite this
procedure, and are sometimes willing to provide a post-default waiver of
notice. In the absence of the ability to obtain such a waiver of notice,
secured creditors are faced with an inevitable delay in the liquidation of
repossessed collateral, which can result in loss to both the creditor and
the debtor.
Similarly, Maryland did not adopt the proposed amendment to
Section 9-505 which permits a waiver of the thirty-day waiting period
for strict foreclosures. Essentially, under Section 9-505(2), a secured
party who desires to retain collateral in full satisfaction of the debt
(strict foreclosure) is required to so notify the debtor and to allow the
debtor thirty days within which to object to the strict foreclosure and,
thus, to force a sale of the collateral under Section 9-504. The proposed
amendment allows the secured party to obtain a waiver of the waiting
period. Again, it is difficult to perceive how a debtor has been prejudiced
by giving a known post-default waiver of the thirty-day period, and it is
119. Note that "debtor" may also include a guarantor of the debt. MD. COM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 9-105(1)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1980) defines "debtor" as "the person who owes payment
or other performance of the obligation secured' (emphasis added). See, e.g., Hepworth v.
Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 323 So. 2d 41, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 542 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Commercial Discount Corp. v. Bayen, 57 Ill. App. 295, 372 N.E.2d 926, 23 U.C.C. Rep.
1376 (1978). But see First National Park Bank v. Johnson, 553 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1977).
For a general discussion of this topic, see Sachs & Belgrad, Liability Of The Guarantor Of
Secured Indebtedness After Default And Repossession Under The Uniform Commercial
Code: A Walk On The Wild Side By The Secured Party, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 153 (1976).
120. For a discussion of the method of providing notice, see Crest Investment Trust,
Inc. v. Alatzas, 264 Md. 571, 287 A.2d 261 (1972). For a general discussion of the notice
requirements, see, e.g., Wheeless v. Eudora Bank, 256 Ark. 644, 509 S.W.2d 532, 14 U.C.C.
Rep. 1068 (1974) (debtor is entitled to specific notification of a date after which the
creditor will dispose of the collateral); Associates Financial Services Co., Inc. v. DiMarco,
383 A.2d 296, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1394 (Del. 1978) (notice of a private sale was insufficient
where collateral was sold at a public sale); Morris Plan Company of Bettendorf v. Johnson,
133 Il. App. 2d 717, 271 N.E.2d 404, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 728 (1971) (code requires more than a
general advertisement or a reasonable expectation on the part of the debtor); Umbaugh
Pole Building Co., Inc. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 390 N.E.2d 320, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 809
(1979) (oral notice is sufficient where written notification would not have given the debtor
any more protection). See generally MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § i-203 (1975) which states
the obligation of good faith in performing duties under the Uniform Commercial Code.
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evident that a failure to obtain such a waiver only unnecessarily
increases the burdens which already exist upon the creditor in such a
situation.
Both Sections 9-504 and 9-505 require a secured party exercising
any default remedies under those provisions to send notice to any
subordinate security interest holders in the collateral and to the debtor.
The proposed amendment under the 1972 Official Code eliminates the
necessity of a post-default financing statement search by requiring that
the above notices only be given to those subordinate security interest
holders who actually notify the secured party in writing of their interest
in the collateral. The Bar Committee vehemently objected to this
amendment on the basis that the junior encumbrancer was in such an
inferior position under the Code that the need to protect him far
outweighed the burden placed upon the secured party to conduct the
financing statements records search.12 ' As a practical matter, the
prudent secured creditor desiring to obtain the maximum return on
repossessed collateral would desire to notify any party having a
potential claim, in the hopes that such party might aid in generating
prospective purchases of the collateral or otherwise act to financially
protect its subordinate interest, and thus hopefully clear the lien of the
first lien security interest holder. Accordingly, the failure of Maryland
to adopt this change does not appear to have any practical harmful
effect upon secured lenders.
X. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Revised Code Sections 10-105 through 10-112 provide transition
rules governing the application of the Revised Code provisions. These
rules should be carefully reviewed by practitioners, particularly with
respect to the Revised Code's application to existing security interests.
While Revised Code Section 10-105(2) states that the Revised Code
becomes effective at 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 1981, Revised Code
Section 10-106 provides that Prior Code Section 10-102 will continue
to be effective in governing the transition from pre-Code law to the
Uniform Commercial Code concerning transactions validly entered into
prior to the effective date of the Prior Code. In addition, this Section
requires that the Prior Code and the Revised Code are to be considered
as one continuous statute for the purposes of that transition.
Section 10-112 of the Revised Code states that the amendments
enacted in the Revised Code are deemed declaratory of the meaning of
121. Leitess, supra note 117, July 1972 at 21.
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the Prior Code unless a change in law has clearly been effected.' 2 2 The
general rule of transition is stated in Revised Section 10-107, which
states that the new amendments apply even to security interests
granted under the Prior Code, and that such interests may be
"terminated, completed, consummated, or enforced" under the Revised
Code.' 23 However, a major exception to this general transition rule is
found in Section 10-111 of the Revised Code, which requires that
priority matters are to be determined under the Prior Code if the
positions of the parties were fixed prior to January 1, 1981. The
following is an example of the operation of this exception, illustrating
the applicable changes under Section 9-312(5) (the "first-to-file or-
perfect" rule) of the Revised Code.
Day 1 - A files but makes no advance under loan.
Day 4 - B makes loan and perfects by possession.
Day 6 - A makes an advance.
Pursuant to the prior "first-to-perfect" rule, B wins and his security
interest has priority. Under the revised "first-to-file or -perfect" rule, A
wins and his security interest has priority.
Under the transitional rules, if Day 4 is before January 1, 1981,
then the prior rule prevails because the positions of the parties were
fixed before January 1, 1981, and B's security interest is superior. If
122. The California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District has applied this rule
of interpretation in the case of Dynair Electronics, Inc. v. Video Cable, Inc., 55 Cal. App.
3d 11, 127 Cal. Rptr. 268, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 1047 (1976). In that case, the court was
classifying eight contracts which involved rights to performance as either contract rights
or general intangibles. In reaching its decision, the court observed that the definitional
consolidation of contract rights and accounts under the 1976 amendments to the
California Commercial Code clarify that contract rights as defined before the 1976
amendments only involved rights to payments and not rights to performance. As a basis
for this conclusion, the court relied upon CAL. COM. CODE Section 11108 which is
California's equivalent to Revised Code Section 10-112.
Although the Florida District Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, did not specifically
cite the Florida statutory equivalent of Revised Code Section 10-112, this same rule of
statutory interpretation was utilized by that court in the case of Kahn v. Capital Bank,
384 So. 2d 976, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 289 (Fla. App. 1980). In deciding that the proceeds of a
casualty insurance policy were properly payable to a secured party holding a perfected
security interest on the destroyed collateral, the court observed that the 1979 amendments
to the Florida Commercial Code were simply declaratory of the pre-amendment case law
dealing with the proceeds of insurance policies on collateral.
123. The major advantage of having the amendments proposed under the 1972
OFFICIAL TEXT applicable to security interests existing as of the effective date of the
amendments is the more liberal notice rules under proposed Sections 9-504 and 9-505;
however, since Maryland did not incorporate those amendments in the Revised Code, that
potential advantage is of no consequence in Maryland.
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Day 4 is on or after January 1, 1981, then the revised rule governs and
A's security interest has priority. 1
24
In addition, Revised Section 10-108 provides a curative provision
which states that security interests not properly perfected under the
Prior Code will be deemed to be perfected as of January 1, 1981, if under
the Revised Code the security interest would be considered perfected. 125
Revised Section 10-109(1) regulates the duration of financing state-
ments that had not lapsed prior to January 1, 1981. This section
basically states that such financing statements remain effective for the
period prescribed under the Prior Code in effect at the time of the
filing.' 2 ' Practitioners should take special note of the provisions found
in Revised Section 10-109(2) dealing with refilings. If the provisions of
the Revised Code require a different filing office from the one in which a
financing statement was originally filed, then a new financing state-
124. The significance of a provision equivalent to Revised Code Section 10-111 is also
illustrated by the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court in the case of Mid-West National
Bank v. Metcoff, 23 Ill. App. 3d 607, 319 N.E.2d 336, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 230 (1974). That case
involved a priority conflict concerning the rights to a beneficial interest in a land trust
between a lien creditor and a secured party who had not filed a financing statement. By
the time that the appeal was heard, Illinois had adopted the 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT of Section
9-302(1)(c) which provides automatic perfection, without filing, for security interests
arising out of the assignment of beneficial interests in a trust. The court observed that
since the 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT of Section 9-302 was in effect at the time the competing
interests arose, the Illinois statutory equivalent of Revised Code Section 10-111 made it
clear that the change in filing requirements were of no avail to the dilatory secured party.
125. An example may be helpful. Revised Code Section 9-103(3) provides, in effect,
that a secured party holding a security interest in accounts should perfect in the
jurisdiction in which the debtor's chief executive office is located. Under Prior Code
Section 9-103(1) perfection is obtained in the jurisdiction where the debtor maintained an
office in which records of the accounts were maintained. Under the curative provision of
Revised Code Section 10-111, such a secured party who was unperfected because he had
improperly filed prior to January 1, 1981 in Maryland (the chief executive office
jurisdiction) would be automatically perfected on January 1, 1981.
In addition, under Revised Code Section 9-302(1)(c) a security interest arising
out of an assignment of a beneficial interest in a decedent's estate or trust is automatically
perfected without filing. This particular automatic perfection provision did not exist under
the Prior Code. Thus, if a secured party who has been assigned such a beneficial interest
prior to January 1, 1981 had failed to file a financing statement, his security interest
would nevertheless become perfected on January 1, 1981 pursuant to curative provision in
Revised Code Section 10-108. It is important to remember that his priority position vis a
vis competing secured interests would still be determined under Revised Code Section
10-111. See note 124 supra.
126. Under Prior Code Sections 9-403 and 9-403.1, financing statements filed prior to
June 30, 1978 are effective for a period of five years from the date of filing unless an
earlier date is stated, and financing statements filed after June 30, 1978 are effective for a
period of twelve years from the date of filing unless an earlier maturity date is stated.
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ment conforming to Revised Code Section 10_110127 or the original or a
photocopy of the original must be filed in the correct filing office. 128 This
Section creates a trap for unwary practitioners or secured lenders who
have not kept abreast of the changes occasioned by the Revised Code. 12
9
Revised Code Section 10-109(2) also requires that any continuation or
other statements relating to the original financing statements be filed
in the filing office as required by the Revised Code.
Section 10-110(1) of the Revised Code establishes a three-year
grace period for the perfection of security interests that were perfected
without filing under the Prior Code but for which filing is required
under the Revised Code.' 30 In such instances perfection will continue
until January 1, 1984; thereafter, perfection lapses unless a financing
statement, as opposed to a continuation statement, is filed in accordance
with Section 10-110(4) of the Revised Code. 13 1
CONCLUSION
Maryland's adoption of many major substantive and procedural
changes in Article 9 as proposed in the 1972 Official Text requires
127. The special requirements for a financing statement to be filed under Section
10-110(4) of the Revised Code are that it: (1) identify the security agreement; (2) identify
the office and date of the last filing; (3) identify the recording numbers of the last filing;
and (4) state that the security agreement is still effective. This Section also provides that
the financing statement is effective if it is signed by either the debtor or the secured party.
128. Revised Code Section 9-103(3)(b), dealing with multistate transactions involving
accounts, is the most obvious provision which may cause refilings to be made in filing
offices that are different from the one in which the original financing statement is filed.
See text accompanying notes 38 to 43 supra.
129. Revised Code Section 10-109(2) differs significantly from its corresponding
provision under the 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT, Section 11-105(2). Under proposed Section
11-105(2) it is obvious that existing financing statements remain effective as to existing
collateral but not as to after-acquired property, unless an appropriate refiling is made.
Revised Code Section 10-109(2) does not provide any such comfort. Unfortunately, the
section is completely devoid of any stated sanction or consequence for a failure to comply
with the refiling requirement. In light of this uncertainty, prudent practitioners will be
wise to review their clients' existing transactions which might require a refiling under
Revised Code Section 10-109(2) under the assumption that failure to refile, where
appropriate, may result in the loss of perfection.
130. The most readily apparent situation to which this provision applies is Section
9
-
3 02(i)(c) of the Prior Code which provided automatic perfection for purchase money
security interests in farm equipment having a purchase price of $500 or less. This
exception to the filing requirements has been eliminated under Revised Code Section
9-302, and thus, perfection will continue for existing security interests without filing
until January 1, 1984.
131. Revised Code Section 10-110(4) permits filing of financing statements "within six
months before the perfection. . . would otherwise lapse." Thus, immediate filings to avoid
the lapse of perfection prescribed in Revised Code Section 10-110(1) would appear to be
fruitless, and such filings should be withheld until July 1, 1983.
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practitioners to review carefully their procedures and documentation.
The impact of these changes is significant since Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code directly or indirectly affects most commercial transac-
tions. Unfortunately, the degree of a practitioner's compliance with the
requirements of Article 9 only becomes evident under the test of
litigation or bankruptcy proceedings.
The changes made in the Revised Code remedy many imperfections
that became apparent after the initial adoption by Maryland of Article
9. Moreover, these changes have the practical effect of making
Maryland law more consistent with the laws of other states. Unfortu-
nately, Maryland has rejected a great opportunity to adopt the altered
priority analysis proposed in the 1972 Official Text with respect to
fixture financing, and the relatively minor, but significant, waiver
proposals with respect to post-default notices. However, it is believed
that an overall evaluation of the changes can only lead to the conclusion
that both debtors and creditors in Maryland have gained greatly from
the clarifications and improvements in practice found in Revised Article
9.
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